


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Normative Support for Terrorism: The Attitudes and Beliefs of Immediate Relatives of Jema'ah Islamiyah Members

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Families might be an important source of norms that legitimize terrorism, an assumption that has yet to be tested empirically. To investigate this, surveys were administered to 20 immediate relatives of 16 Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI) members in Indonesia. Family members were found to agree with their kin's involvement in the violent activities of JI, and perceived their community as being supportive. Agreement with their relative's involvement in JI was predicted by anti-Western sentiment, not support for violent jihad. Kinship to a suicide bomber predicted less support for their family member's involvement in JI. Implications for deradicalization strategies are discussed.

My feeling is as sad as other fathers who have lost their son. However, the biggest regret I have is that I am not the one who died a martyr to help my wife and my children.

—Participant, 3 March 2007, East Java

Part of what makes terrorism so shocking is that it involves an array of behaviors that are completely beyond the norms for appropriate conduct in most societies. Even within

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the rules of warfare, the killing of innocent civilians is generally viewed as unacceptable. In search of what might possibly motivate someone to engage in such apparently anti-normative acts, psychologists have proposed a variety of intuitively appealing hypotheses. Several of these have been challenged with empirical data, while others have yet to be put to the empirical test.

The present research considered the possibility that terrorism is not as anti-normative as it may first appear. Inspired by classic psychological experiments that emphasize the power of social factors,¹ the authors hypothesized that a normative support structure might surround those who engage in terrorism. Specifically, they investigated whether a family environment might be a source of such normative support, whereby family members endorse the use of violence and share attitudes that legitimize terrorism. To this end, data was collected through structured surveys administered to the immediate relatives of individuals directly engaged in terrorist activity. To set the stage for the present study, the article begins by contextualizing how normative influence is positioned among other competing hypotheses that evoke psychological factors to explain terrorism.

Psychological Explanations of Terrorism

Early psychological theorizing treated terrorism at face value: these abnormal behaviors were attributed to abnormalities of the mind. Such explanations are exemplified by Morf's description of members of the French-Canadian extremist group, the Front de Libération du Québec, as "generally rejecting the father and values he represents," while being driven by "sexual lust, craving for notoriety, and thirst for power."² To this day, such remotely performed diagnoses continue to be made,³ and this despite much evidence that psychological maladies are poor predictors of participation in collective violence.⁴ Such evidence first surfaced in research with members of the National Liberation Front in Algeria, where no apparent mental illnesses were found.⁵ These findings were later corroborated with clinical assessments of members of the Irish Republican Army,⁶ and more recently with both secular and radical Islamist terrorists.⁷ The accumulated evidence has led to the rejection of the psychopathology model of terrorism by experts in disciplines as varied as political science,⁸ sociology,⁹ clinical psychology,¹⁰ and psychiatry.¹¹

As mental illness was refuted, psychologists turned their attention to social factors as potential explanations for terrorism. This shift has generally produced theories with a focus on poverty, where the awareness of one's relative disadvantage vis à vis another group may radicalize a person, and potentially lead to terrorism.¹² However, empirical studies focusing on poverty and relative deprivation have yielded mixed results, and there is evidence that most people engaged in terrorism are not lacking economic opportunity.¹³ In one study of the recent global *jihadi* terrorism movement, Sageman tracked down demographic information for 102 *jihadists*: three fourths of his sample were from the upper or middle classes.¹⁴

Although economic deprivation *per se* has not proven to be a reliable predictor, hypotheses based on social psychological processes, which emphasize the influence of the individual's context, still remain the most promising avenue for explaining terrorism. Indeed, social psychology has a long tradition of demonstrating that very "normal" people, when placed in specific social situations, are capable of very "abnormal" behaviors. Here, one is reminded of the classic conformity experiments, where "normal" people placed under social pressure are either found to readily agree with obviously incorrect perceptions,¹⁵ or inflict severe harm on others.¹⁶

Specific to enabling terrorism, one social psychological process that has been theorized to play an important role is normative influence.¹⁷ The presumption is that, even if extreme

violence is unacceptable to most, people who engage in terrorism benefit from the support of some. For the “terrorist,” being immediately surrounded by favorable opinions about violence may validate a perspective that their acts are within the norms of acceptable behavior. The results of Milgram’s classic experiments on aggression, where participants were asked to give electric shocks to a person when they committed errors on a learning task, lend support to the influence of norms. In these studies, participants were especially obedient to injurious commands when they were among compliant others.¹⁸

Normative support may thus be crucial to understanding how people engage in the violent, apparently anti-normative acts that make up terrorism. Thus, to study this, the authors turned to the most immediate and potentially significant people surrounding those who engage in terrorism: the family. Specifically, the present study investigated if normative support existed in the families of terrorist group members. Family was chosen as it is composed of people who are positioned to be influential for the “terrorist”: wife, mother, father, sister, or brother. Intuitively, because of the risks involved in carrying out terrorism, it might be expected that family members strongly disapprove of a relative engaging in such a dangerous behavior. However, a small literature has hinted at the potential role of family members as important sources of norms that legitimize such extreme violence.

Family Norms

Post, Sprinzak, and Denny interviewed people in the Middle East who were incarcerated for acts of terror, and documented their path toward terrorism.¹⁹ In these interviews, some detainees described their families as overtly encouraging their involvement in terrorist activities, while others described their families as providing more implicit reinforcement. In most cases, families seemed to provide some type of normative support.

Families’ support for terrorism has been thought to be partially motivated by rational, cost-benefit considerations. According to a study of suicide-bombers in the Middle East,²⁰ terrorism often provides families with both tangible and intangible rewards. Families can gain social status, receive money, and derive religious benefits following a family member’s suicide bombing. In such circumstances, one can appreciate the potential influence of these rewards on the families’ attitudes toward their kin’s involvement in terror. However, these family attitudes remain inferences. Attitudes and support were not directly measured, but rather inferred based on speculation about the motivational properties of tangible and intangible rewards.

In one study where families were directly questioned, Asal, Fair, and Shellman attempted to identify factors that predict parental consent for their child’s engagement in violent *jihad* in Pakistan.²¹ The parents most likely to give permission were found to be older heads of households, as opposed to younger ones, and those who placed their sons in Islamic boarding schools, as opposed to public or private schools. In contrast, families who had indicators of wealth and self-identified as Deobandi, an orthodox Islamic school of thought often portrayed in the media as extremist,²² were least likely to consent to their child’s participation in *jihad*. Despite these findings, it remains unclear to what extent the family supported the ideologies embraced by their son who engaged in violent *jihad*. The binary format of their main dependent variable (i.e., consent or refusal for their child’s militant acts), yielded little insight into the mindset of those who made the decision. Families who did consent might have created an ideological environment where *jihad* was encouraged. Alternatively, the children might have acquired the ideology outside their family milieu, and parents simply consented without necessarily agreeing with the violence involved.

All these studies²³ suggest that families have somehow influenced their kin's involvement in terrorism. This family influence is assumed to stem from a normative support structure, whereby family members hold beliefs and attitudes that may facilitate terrorism. However, the presence of family-based normative influence cannot be confidently ascertained, as these studies provide no direct empirical evidence that family members supported terrorism. That is, the beliefs and attitudes of family members were not explicitly measured. Thus, before assuming that families might influence their kin toward terrorism, the families' opinions about terrorism need be verified. The present study is an attempt to address this assumption. In the hopes of contributing to an understanding of the role of family influence, the present study measured the extent to which the immediate relatives of those who engage in terrorism provide a normative support structure for terrorism.

Hypotheses

The present study investigated one main hypothesis: immediate relatives of people engaged in terrorism were expected to display normative support for terrorism. This support would be indicated through their agreement with (1) violent acts carried out by their kin and (2) specific worldviews that serve to legitimize violence, in this case anti-Western sentiment and violent *jihad*.²⁴ This normative support structure was also anticipated to include others, whereby family members were expected to perceive their community as being supportive of their kin's involvement in a terrorist group.

Beyond this main hypothesis, an exploratory analysis was conducted to identify factors that might predict family members' agreement with the terrorist activities of their kin. In this analysis, the authors expected support for terrorist activities to be especially high among a specific sub-group of the sample: people related to someone who has committed a suicide bombing. This expectation was based on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that the level of commitment involved in conducting a suicide bombing might stem from the family's strong support for a terrorist group and its ideology. Second, because families were interviewed after the death of their relative, participants might show increased support for terrorist activities as a way of making sense of their loss, or to justify the death of their relative.

Research Context

These hypotheses were investigated with family members of people in Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI), an Islamist extremist group based in Indonesia. JI is most notorious for its 2002 bombings of a nightclub on the resort island of Bali. In addition, JI has also been blamed for the coordinated bombings of churches in multiple cities (24 December 2000), the bombing of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (13 September 2000), the Marriott hotel bombing (5 August 2003), the Australian embassy bombing (9 September 2004), and the bombings of two hotels in Jakarta (17 July 2009).

JI is often referred to as an Al Qaeda affiliate in South-East Asia,²⁵ and superficially, both organizations do appear similar. This similarity has been reinforced by Al Qaeda, as it has claimed credit for certain accomplishments of JI, such as the 2002 Bali bombings.²⁶ True, many relationships were forged when JI members joined the Afghan *jihad* against the Soviets alongside future Al Qaeda members,²⁷ and collaborations between members of both organizations have occurred since.²⁸ However, it must be noted that JI pre-dates the formal Al Qaeda organization, and has roots in Indonesia's indigenous Muslim political movements, such as Darul Islam and the Masyumi party.²⁹ And despite the relationships that

exist among members of both organizations, JI's agenda and interests remain independent from those of Al Qaeda's central leadership.³⁰ If Al Qaeda does have direct influence in Indonesia, it is probably through a network of people recruited by Noordin Top, who left JI to form *Al-Qaeda Jihad Organization for the Malay Archipelago*.³¹ To highlight JI's independence from Al Qaeda, however, is not to minimize the fact that JI remains a serious threat to Indonesians, and Western interests in South-East Asia.

Method

Participants

Participants were sought through a targeted recruitment strategy. At first, a review of the literature about terrorism reportedly perpetrated by JI was carried out. This review included security services reports, think-tank reports, Internet and media publications, books, and academic publications. Additional information was obtained from key experts, journalists, and religious and community leaders. Based on the information collected, a list of people who were members of JI was compiled. Through months of extensive informal networking, their families were contacted directly, informed of this study, and solicited for participation.

In total, 20 immediate relatives of 16 Jema'ah Islamiyah members were interviewed. Each family had at least one JI member who had either been convicted of a terrorist act, committed a suicide bombing, or died fighting American forces in Iraq. The family members were 11 women and 9 men. The distribution of JI members and respondents per family is represented in Table 1.

Procedure

Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire, which was translated into Bahasa, and back-translated into English for verification. In this questionnaire, participants indicated, on rating scales ranging from -5 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), their

Table 1
Distribution of JI members and respondents per family

	Family	JI members	Respondents
	A	3	3
	B	1	1
	C	2	1
	D	1	1
	E	1	2
	F	1	3
	G	2	2
	H	1	1
	I	1	2
	J	1	1
	K	1	1
	L	1	2
Total	12	16	20

agreement with a series of statements concerning four variables of interest. The complete list of statements is presented in Appendix A.

First, participants indicated their level of agreement with their family member's involvement in the violent activities of JI. This was measured with two items ($\alpha = .69$), and served as the main dependent variable. The second and third variables assessed beliefs and attitudes promoted by JI, as outlined in their *General Guide for the Struggle of Al-Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*.³² Here, the second variable related to participants' support for the violent form of *jihad*, and was measured with three items ($\alpha = .86$). The third variable concerned anti-Western sentiment, measured with four items ($\alpha = .70$) developed by Haddad and Khashan.³³ The fourth variable, consisting of two items ($\alpha = .62$), assessed perceptions of the surrounding community's support for their family member's involvement in JI.

Because answering questions using rating scales is an unusual practice in Indonesia, the questionnaire used few items, these were kept short and simple, and a researcher was always available if a family member needed assistance. Through direct questioning, the researcher verified information about the two family-level variables of interest: if a family member had committed a suicide bombing for JI, and how many people in the family were JI members. All interviews took place in participants' homes, on the island of Java, and were conducted in Indonesian (bahasa Indonesia).

Results

Normative Support

On average, using scales ranging from -5 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), participants reported agreeing with their family member's involvement in the violent activities of JI ($M = 2.13$, $SD = 2.10$). They presented slightly above "neutral" opinions in regards to the violent form of *jihad* ($M = 0.60$, $SD = 2.12$) and anti-Western sentiment ($M = 0.21$, $SD = 1.04$). Across all families, participants reported higher agreement with their family members' action in comparison to their support for the underlying ideologies of violent *jihad* and anti-Western sentiment. When these results were organized by family role, as seen in Figure 1, the brothers ($n = 3$) differentiate themselves as being the most supportive of their kin's activities in JI.

Participants reported that they perceived their community as being supportive of their kin's involvement in JI ($M = 1.70$, $SD = 1.71$). When combining these perceptions of community opinion with their own reports of agreeing with their kin's acts in JI, a possible normative environment for JI members can be constructed (see Figure 2).

Predicting Agreement with a Relative's Involvement in Terrorist Activities of JI

An exploratory analysis was conducted to identify which factors might predict family members' agreement with the terrorist activities perpetrated by their kin. For this analysis, the hierarchical structure of the data was taken into account. Both individuals and families are units in the analysis, yet they are not independent of each other: participants are nested within families. By recognizing this hierarchical structure, two problematic features of such data can be resolved. The first feature involves the possible correlated responses from participants in the same family. Such correlations often violate the basic requirements of non-hierarchical statistical techniques. The second feature is that, with conventional statistical methods, it is difficult to disentangle variables that affected the whole family from variables that only affect certain individuals.³⁴ With a hierarchical structure, family effects




Figure 1. Responses to scale questions by participants categorized by family role.

are treated as second-level variables whereas individual effects are first-level variables. Thus, to adequately account for family-level variables in the context of participant-level variables, while also considering possible correlated responses between participants from the same family, the exploratory analysis was performed through hierarchical linear modelling.




Figure 2. Normative environment based on perceptions of community opinion and personal agreement with their family member's violent activities in JI.

The objective of this two-level hierarchical linear model was to explore which variables predict participants' agreement with their kin's violent actions, coded as "AGREE" in the model. On the participant-level of this model, predictors included participants' reported anti-Western sentiment (ANTI.W), support for the violent form of *jihad* (SUPP.V.J), and perceptions of community support for their kin's violent actions (COM.OPIN). The possible correlated responses from participants within the same families were taken into account by having a second level (family-level) in the model. On this family-level, two variables that are thought to affect families were entered, these included the number of JI members in each family (NUM.JI.ME, which varies from 1 to 3), and if a family member conducted a suicide bombing (MARTYR, dummy coded as "0" if no suicide bomber in the family, and "1" if a member of the family committed a suicide bombing).

Hierarchical linear modelling was performed on an initial model that included all variables, presented in Appendix B. This modeling was conducted through HLM software version 6. The authors used restricted maximum likelihood estimators, which are more appropriate for small sample sizes, especially those with relatively few second level units.³⁵

The number of JI members in the family (NUM.JI.ME) was not found to interact with any level-1 variables, and was thus excluded from the model. Furthermore, participants' support for the violent form of *jihad* (SUPP.V.J) was not found to be associated with levels of agreement (AGREE), and was also removed. The variables that yielded significant coefficients generated the following model (see Appendix B for model details):

Participant-level Model

$$\text{AGREE} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{ANTI.W} + \beta_2 * \text{COM.OPIN} + R$$

Family-level Model

$$\beta_0 = 1.26 - 20.60 * \text{MARTYR}$$

$$\beta_1 = 1.16$$

$$\beta_2 = -0.03 + 2.62 * \text{MARTYR}$$

In this model, participants' agreement with their relative's JI-related activities is predicted by their level of anti-Western sentiment. Here, higher anti-Western sentiment predicts higher agreement. Perceived community opinion about JI activities also predicted agreement, however, only when the participant was related to a suicide bomber.³⁶ Additionally, participants who were related to a suicide bomber tended to have lower levels of agreement with their relative's activities in JI.³⁷

Discussion

Normative Support

This study assessed the extent to which the immediate relatives of people engaged in terrorism provide a normative support structure for terrorism. In the context of the research on members of Jema'ah Islamiyah (JI), all 12 families surveyed reported support, in the form of agreement, with the terrorist acts perpetrated by their kin. Thus, relatives who engaged in terrorism were not cast as the "black sheep" of the family, nor were their

violent actions judged as a form of rebellion against the family. These results support the hypothesis that people engaged in terrorism can receive considerable normative support from their families. Moreover, families perceived their community as being supportive of their kin's involvement in JI. Together, explicit agreement with their kin's acts and the perception of community support is indicative that a normative support structure does surround members of JI.

These findings lend support to a small set of studies that bring attention to the role of family members in terrorism. Indeed, studies involving people incarcerated for terrorism in the Middle-East, Palestinian suicide bombers, and *jihadists* in Pakistan have all presumed that the attitudes and beliefs of immediate relatives facilitate people's involvement in terrorism.³⁸ The present study adds direct assessments of the family member's attitudes and beliefs to this body of knowledge. Taken together, results from previous research and the present study seem to indicate that family members play an important role in *jihadi*-type terrorism. They provide a normative support structure, moral oxygen,³⁹ for those inclined to participate in violent *jihad*. Indeed, Magouirk, Atran, and Sageman have concluded from social network analysis that kinship is the "glue that holds radical networks together in South-East Asia."⁴⁰ The present study reveals one ingredient of this glue: the basic social psychological influence of norms.

Post has described how families might directly contribute generational dynamics that facilitate terrorism.⁴¹ In one generational dynamic, youth are thought to act out against a previous generation, producing social-revolutionary terrorism. In another generational dynamic, youth are thought to follow the family lineage of dissent, producing nationalist-separatist terrorism. It would seem that the generational dynamics operating within JI follow the latter.

Here, it is important to situate these families in the larger Indonesian context. Although the beliefs and attitudes reported in this study might appear anti-normative, these families are not on the fringes of society. Polling suggests that 15 percent of people in Indonesia believe "suicide bombings and other acts of violence in defense of Islam" are justified.⁴² Similar public opinions were found in a survey of Muslim countries carried out in 2006 and 2007 for the University of Maryland's School for Public Policy. Of the 1,141 interviews conducted in Indonesia, 73 percent of respondents believed it was America's objective to weaken and divide Muslim societies, and 15 percent supported Al Qaeda's attacks and shared its ideology.⁴³ The families who participated in the study might simply be representative of this rather large minority that supports the use of terrorism in varying degrees. Considering that the number of people who actually engage in terrorism is infinitely smaller than the number of people who condone terrorism, one is reminded of the difficulty of establishing causality between these attitudes and violent action. The causality conundrum not only applies to the present study, but also other studies where family attitudes about terrorism are discussed.⁴⁴ Although family norms might predict a kin's decision to engage in terrorism, having a "terrorist" in the family might also influence family opinion. Research is needed to differentiate the conditions that lead to violent action from the conditions that lead to mere support for violence.

After a closer look at the ratings of agreement about their kin's involvement in the violent activities of JI, it was found that brothers seemed especially supportive. Comparing family members was not a particular objective of this study, nor is this comparison statistically reliable because of the small number of "brothers" in the sample. However, the pattern of responses found in the results substantiates Jones's analysis that "adolescent children and siblings of current JI leaders, particularly the boys, are likely to succeed them."⁴⁵ As such, the present authors reiterate her recommendation to focus Indonesian

counterterrorism strategies on steering the children of current JI members away from the family business.

Predicting Agreement with a Relative's Involvement in JI Activities

The attitudes of family members related to a suicide bomber were found, based on hierarchical linear modeling, to be strongly associated with perceived community opinions. This result suggests that normative influence might extend beyond the family. However, the effects of a family member having committed a suicide bombing were contrary to the authors' predictions. The presence of a martyr was expected to be a predictor of the families who would be most supportive of their kin's involvement in JI. Although those families still agreed with their relative's involvement in JI, the presence of a martyr was associated with less support. This lack of support was evident in the authors' conversation with one participant, who was the sister of a suicide bomber: "Did he forget about his family? Besides, he was still young, and there were a lot of more important things he could have done instead of bombing himself."⁴⁶ Such decreased family support merits closer attention, as these results seemingly clash with other research reporting the intentions of suicide bombers. In analyzing their final testaments, Hafez found that Palestinian suicide bombers hope their sacrifice will bring pride, honor, and religious benefits to their families.⁴⁷ Conversely, the decreased family support reported in the present study is mirrored in the United States, among qualitative accounts of parental support for their son's involvement in gang violence. Although parents can tolerate their son's participation in gang violence for years, this tolerance can easily fade once the violence disrupts their personal lives, such as when their son sustains major injury or dies.⁴⁸ Losing a family member to terrorism may engender feelings of pride and religious benefits in some cases, but probably produces grief in all cases, which might present potential avenues to explore for deradicalization strategies. The Interior Ministry of Pakistan has exploited this grief in its own terrorist rehabilitation programs, and has reported this strategy to be effective.⁴⁹

Participants' endorsement of violent *jihad* was not predictive of their support for their kin's involvement in the violent activities of JI. Rather, it was their ratings of anti-Western sentiment. These results seem to anchor the legitimacy of terrorism in the idea that the West deserves it. These findings highlight the importance of "image-management" for the West, and in particular for the United States. Throughout the authors' fieldwork in Indonesia, they were regularly confronted with misperceptions about Westerners. Indeed, popular sources of information about the West, such as music videos and Hollywood movies, can give rise to impressions that all Westerners are individualistic, materialistic, and devoid of morality. Indeed, this moral depravity was specifically invoked by Amrozi bin Nurhasyim, in his court address during the trials of the 2002 Bali bombings. "What would happen to Bali in 10 years if I hadn't bombed it? For sure, the morals of Indonesians would be severely ruined because most people would not be going to mosques, churches and temples. The Jews, the Americans and their puppets know very well how to destroy the lives of Indonesians. Destroying our morals is very important to them."⁵⁰ The widespread stereotype of the morally depraved Westerner must be addressed. Indeed, one of the West's biggest counterterrorism challenges, claims Hoffman, is to "mitigate grassroots alienation and polarization and to stop the spread of seditious and intolerant beliefs before they take hold and become exploited by demagogues and hatemongers."⁵¹ If these negative stereotypes are indeed a grass-roots problem, counterradicalization strategists should focus on local grass-roots solutions, and in the case of Indonesia, the works of Emha Ainun Nadjib. Nadjib is a religious preacher and leader of a renowned musical group known as Kiai Kanjeng,

which continuously tours Indonesia, giving free performances that often attract thousands. Between musical sets, Nadjib regularly invites people on stage to discuss inter-faith issues. Frequently, these guests are Westerners and people of various faiths; they are not only interviewed by Nadjib on stage, but asked to answer questions from the audience. During such dialogues, Nadjib always emphasizes the shared commonalities between people, as opposed to their differences. In these exchanges with foreigners on stage, Nadjib challenges normative beliefs about Westerners. Such appearances offer counterstereotypes for many Indonesians who might not have contact with Westerners,⁵² and are thought to disconfirm the negative stereotypes people hold of members of different groups.⁵³ While Nadjib might not convince hardened JI members to re-examine their beliefs, these performances might be effective for those in the earlier stages of the radicalization process. Certainly, Nadjib's initiative represents a social psychological answer to certain social psychological factors involved in justifying terrorism.

Limitations and Conclusion

Of course, two caveats must be placed on the inferences drawn from the results obtained in this study. First, the existence of a normative support structure cannot be concluded unequivocally, as the families' support might also be an attempt to justify their relative's highly costly anti-normative acts. Second, caution is necessary when generalizing the data from these JI families to violent extremists outside the Indonesian context. The results mirror what has been inferred in other families of people engaged in violent *jihad*,⁵⁴ however, it must be noted that JI members have been considered to differ from other global *jihadists* by their relatively religious childhood-upbringing,⁵⁵ a difference that most likely extends to their families. This said, there is anecdotal evidence from several terrorism plots that indicate the transmission of these norms within families.⁵⁶ One well-mediatized Canadian example is the family of Ahmad Said al-Khadr, whose wife, one of two daughters, and three of four sons, have been reported to espouse a *jihadi* ideology. Beyond generalizability, however, lies the importance of understanding each terrorist group in its unique context. This is arguably the only way to devise effective counterterrorism strategies. And as with any terrorist organization, JI's context is indeed unique.

Through skilled policing and counterterrorism in Indonesia, JI has been dealt important setbacks in the past several years. However, there are few signs that the movement is dying out. JI has retained many adherents, remains determined to confront Islam's enemies,⁵⁷ and continues to recruit.⁵⁸ Former JI members have established splinter groups committed to violent *jihad*.⁵⁹ More recently, many unreformed JI members who have finished their prison sentences have been released.⁶⁰ Although many of these ex-convicts may not engage in violence, they can provide a fresh infusion of normative support needed to reverse the recent setbacks JI has received.

If the normative support provided by families does play a significant role in sustaining violence, as the results suggest, specific counterterrorism measures could exploit the influence of family members who disagree with JI's mission. However, the family members who do support the violence undertaken by their kin should not be regarded as solely problematic. As this study has shown, these family members are approachable, and quite willing to discuss their beliefs and attitudes.

Notes

1. See classic aggression experiments such as Craig Haney, Curtis Banks, and Philip Zimbardo, "Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison," *International Journal of Criminology and Penology*

1 (1973), pp. 69–97; and Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

2. Gustav Morf, *Le Terrorisme Québécois* (Montréal: Éditions de l'homme, 1970).

3. For example, see Russell Razaque, *Human Being to Human Bomb: The Conveyor Belt of Terror* (London: Icon Books, 2008). In this work, Razaque claims people who engage in terrorism have strict fathers and obsessive personalities.

4. Jerrold M. Post, "Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces," in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, States of Mind* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 25–40.

5. Martha Crenshaw, *Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978).

6. Ken Heskin, "The Psychology of Terrorism in Ireland," in Yonah Alexander and Alan O'Day, eds., *Terrorism in Ireland* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 88–105.

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21. Victor Asal, C. Christine Fair, and Stephen Shellman, "Consenting to a Child's Decision to Join a Jihad: Insights from a Survey of Militant Families in Pakistan," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31 (2008), pp. 973–994.

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24. Of course, the authors distinguish the violent interpretation of *jihad* from its more universally accepted meaning of "struggle," which refers to the "effort to live in the way that God had intended for human beings," a definition taken from Karen Armstrong, *Islam: A Short History* (New York: The Modern Library, 2002), p. 6.

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27. Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, *White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism* (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003).

28. For example, in the case of Jack Roche, an Australian national convicted for plotting to bomb the Israeli embassy in Canberra, JI members are thought to have facilitated his meeting with Al Qaeda cadres. This case is mentioned in Justin Magouirk, Scott Atran, and Marc Sageman, "Connecting Terrorist Networks," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 31 (2008), pp. 1–16.

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32. Elena Pavlova, *From Counter-Society to Counter-State: Jemaah Islamiyah According to PUPJI*. (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Working Paper No. 117, 2006).

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36. This is the result of the binary nature of MARTYR: community opinion on level-1 will impact agreement (via β_2) if MARTYR is "1" (indicating that a member of the family committed a suicide bombing). If MARTYR is "0" (indicating no suicide bomber in the family), β_2 approaches zero, and almost cancels COM.OPIN on level-1.

37. The presence of a martyr in the family renders the level-1 intercept (β_0) negative.

38. Asal, Fair, and Shellman, *Consenting to a Child's Decision to Join a Jihad*; Moghadam, *Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the second Intifada*; and Post, Sprinzak, and Denny, *The Terrorists in Their Own Words*.

39. The concept of "moral oxygen" is discussed in Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, *The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism* (London: Demos, 2010).

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60. Noor Huda Ismail and Carl Ungerer, *Jemaah Islamiyah: A Renewed Struggle?* (Policy Analysis no. 46: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2009).
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62. Raudenbush and Bryk, *Hierarchical Linear Models*, p. 261.

Appendix A

Items Used in Questionnaire

Agreement with family member's involvement in the violent activities of JI

- 1) Do you agree with your son's actions? *
- 2) Do you feel regret for your son's action? * R

Support for the violent form of jihad

- 1) Do you agree with other acts of violence like the bombings in Kuta, Bali (in 2002 and 2005), or the Australian Embassy bombing?

- 2) Do you agree with other acts of violence overseas, like in Palestine with mujahideen fighters, in Lebanon with Hezbollah fighters?
- 3) Do you support how certain religious groups use violence to achieve their objectives? ^{H&K}

Anti-Western sentiment

- 1) How do you feel about the attacks that destroyed the Twin Towers in America? ^{H&K}
- 2) Describe the intensity of your grievances against the West? ^{H&K}
- 3) Do you feel that your grievances against the United States warrant support for the September 11 attacks? ^{H&K}
- 4) Do you personally sanction further attacks in the future against western targets? ^{H&K}

Perception of community's support for JI member

- 1) What is your community's opinion of your son's act? *
- 2) Do you experience stigmatization from others because of your son's action? * ^R

* For these items, "son" was replaced with "husband" or "brother," depending on the participant's relationship to the JI member.

^RReverse coded.

^{H&K}Adapted from the work of Haddad & Khashan.⁶¹

Appendix B

Exploratory Hierarchical Linear Modelling

Initial model including all variables:

Participant-level Model

$$\text{AGREE} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{ANTI.W} + \beta_2 * \text{SUPP.V.J} + \beta_3 * \text{COM.OPIN} + R$$

Family-level Model

$$\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * \text{NUM.JI.ME} + \gamma_{02} * \text{MARTYR} + U_0$$

$$\beta_1 = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11} * \text{NUM.JI.ME} + \gamma_{12} * \text{MARTYR}$$

$$\beta_2 = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21} * \text{NUM.JI.ME} + \gamma_{22} * \text{MARTYR}$$

$$\beta_3 = \gamma_{30} + \gamma_{31} * \text{NUM.JI.ME} + \gamma_{32} * \text{MARTYR}$$

Final model containing only variables with significant effects:

Participant-level Model

$$\text{AGREE} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * \text{ANTI.W} + \beta_2 * \text{COM.OPIN} + R$$

Family-level Model

$$\beta_0 = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} * \text{MARTYR}$$

$$\beta_1 = \gamma_{10}$$

$$\beta_2 = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21} * \text{MARTYR}$$

Table A1
Coefficients of intercept and slope terms contained in the final model

Term	Coefficient	SE	<i>t</i> -ratio	df	<i>p</i> -value
γ_{00}	1.26	2.65	0.46	15	0.641 ^a
γ_{01}	-20.60	4.75	-4.34	15	0.001
γ_{10}	1.15	0.34	3.42	15	0.004
γ_{20}	-0.03	0.23	-0.12	15	0.905 ^a
γ_{21}	2.62	0.61	4.27	15	0.001

^aEven though not statistically significant, it is recommended to keep intercepts in the model to avoid biasing estimations of other predictors.⁶²